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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintif!-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.

11688

HAROLD REEMER
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of passing and
uttering a fictitious check.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendant was found guilty and convicted of passing an uttering a fictitious check by unanimous verdict
of seven jurors; Defendant was sentenced to indeterminate term at the Utah State Prison.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Appellant was tried on l\farch 27, 19G!l
in \Velwr County for tlw charge of passing and uttering
a fictitious check.
During the course of the trial, the JH'OS<·cution introduced evidence that tlw Defendant, at various tiuws not
rPlevant to the facts in this case, had used an alias; the
name Richard Feeney. (R. 39043)
During the noon recess of the trial, one of the jurors
hPcame ill; it was stipulatPd that said juror could be
excm;ed; and that the remaining seven jurors could render a verdict in the case. (R. 61)
The seven jurors returned a unanimous verdict of
guilty.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
On appeal Defendant-Appellant checks reversal of
the jurisdiction and remand for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
INTRODUCTION INTO EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD USED AN ALIAS WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN THE DEFENDANT'S USE
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OF THE SAID ALIAS WAS NOT RE LEV ANT OR
MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED BY
THE JURY.

In the present case, the Defendant was charged with
uttering and passing a fictitious check. At no time was
there any question that the Defendant had not used his
own name, Harold Reemer, throughout the transactions
on which the charge was based. The prosecution in its
case in chief, called, as a witness, an officer from the
State Drivers License: Division to testify that the Defendant, Mr. Reemer, had used the name Richard Feeney
in applying for a Utah Drivers License. The substance
of said testimony was:

Q. Would you state your full name for us T
A.

Ernest F. Kyriopoulos.

Q.

And where are you

A.

I am employed at the Department of Public
Safety, Drivers License Division.

Q. What generally arc the duties involved T
A.

I have custody of the records ....

4
Q.

I see. Now, Mr. Kyriopoulos, did you receive
a request from our office to investigate the
driving record of a gentleman by the name
of Harold Reemer and also Richard Feeney?

A.

I had a request from the District Attorney.

l\IR. R I C H A R D S : (interposing) Your
Honor, at this time I would object to the line of
questioning upon thl• grounds that it's immaterial,
and the question involved in this trial here today
is whether or not there is an Ethel Norris and
whether or not this is a false and fictitious check.

It matters not whether l\Ir. Reemer has a
driver's license under another name than Mr.
Harold Reemer.
I don't see how it makes any differencr.
\Ve're willing to admit or stipulate that Mr.
Reemer has also used the name of Mr. Richard
Fel'ney, but I don't know how it plays a role in
the trial today.
THE COURT: Did you say Richard?
l\IR. RICHARDS: Richard.
THE COURT: Richard Feeney'
l\IR. RICHARDS: Yes.
THE COPRT: Do you stipulate that he
also nsed the name of Richard Feeney?
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MR. RICHARDS: Yes, we do. But I think
it's immaterial and I don't see why we need to be
delayed THE COURT: (interposing) Well, what did
you want to
MR. SHARP: We intend, Your Honor, to tie
this is specifically to the action involved.
THE COURT: Well, you want the stipulaMR. SHARP : What I want in evidence is a
copy of the driving record - not the driving
record, but the application and the photograph
identifying him along with the number attached
to the driver's license, Your Honor. We intend
to use it in a later identification.
THE COURT: Well, you mean identification
of the
MR. SHARP: Identification of the defendant
with another transaction which ties in with the
present one.
I think it might be appropriate, Your Honor,
at this time, rather than go into a lot of detail,
maybe we'd better excuse the jury.
THE COURT: Well, I think I'll overrule the
objection. Go ahead
p;oceed
it - what
it amounts to. I'll see if its material later.
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At this point the witness testified that a Hi<·hard
F\:iern•y had a Utah State Drivers License' and that
upon his departments record, lw was able to ddr>rn1i1H'
that Hichard Feeney was the same iwrson as Harold
Heemer.

At no time after this point did the prosecution tie
m the nanw Richard Feeney or, for that mattr>r, even
rPfer to it. X or did the prosecution produce evidence of
another transaction as proffered. Although thP jit<lge
indicated that he would allow the testimony of the alias
in evidence conditionally upon the prosecutions tying it
in later, the court never did reconsider the materiality
of that evidence. Appellant asserts that the testimony
concr>rning the alias was irrelevant, immaterial, and d(•signed only to prejudice him in front of the jury. Inasmuch as the use of the alias could have no possible relevancy or materiality to the issues involved in the prosPcutions case, the evidence could only have been offere<l
to discredit Appellant's character. The record shows
other examples of this type of irrelevant, prejudicial,
character evidence. The record reveals the follmving
testimony when the prosecution examined a police officer
witness.
Q.

18 it my understanding that sonw peo1>1<write th0se checks sort of not caring- ahont
the results; was that what yon saicl'!

A.

Yes . . . . (R. 31)

,,
Q. And would you say that sornetirnes sorne of
the things they might do might he a little

A.

Right. (R. 32)

The prosecution's right to produce adverse character evidence, such as the use of an alias, is well out1ined in the law and is very limited. Such evidence may
only be introduced to rebut good character evidence or,
in some circumstances, if it would tend to prove intent
or knowledge of the crime charged. 29 Alvl Jur. 2d 389390 Evidence § 340 states:
"The character of a person accused of a crime
is not a fact in issue in a prosecution for such a
crime, and the prosecution cannot, in its evidence
in chief, for the purpose of inducing belief in the
accused's guilt introduce evidence tending to show
his bad character or reputation ... unless ...
the accused first introduces evidence of good character or reputation.
Utah follows this general rule. See State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351 (citing State v. Thompson, 58 Utah 291,
199 Pac. 161). In the Utah Hougensen case, Mr. Justice
\V olf. in writing for the Court at page 365 Utah Reports,
stated:
"One can affect it by showing that the Defendant in a criminal case has a bad character as
to a particular trait involved in the commission
of thP crime, bnt only after evidence of the Defendant's good character has bePn received."
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The courhl usually refuse to admit such C'haracter evidence on grounds or relevancy or materiality, See e.g.,
State v. Gress, 250 Minn. 337, 84 N.W. 2d 616; State v.
Garceau,, 122 Vt. 303, 170 Atl. 2d 623. However, the real
rationale behind the rule is one of prejudice. See e.g.,
Topeca v. llarvey,188 Kan. 841, 365 P. 2d 1109 State
V. Garceai1,, 122 Vt. 303, 170 Atl. 2d 623. vVhile use of
an alias may be logically relevant or have some probative
value to finding guilt, the prejudice from such evidence
certainly outweighs the probative value. Such evidence
is sometimes characterized as "bad man" evidence and
the courts fear that a Defendant may be punished by a
jnry for being a "bad man'' rather than because he was
proven guilty of a specific crime. See 29 Am Jur 2d
390, Evidence 340.
The record shows in this case that after the prosecution had admitted evidence of Defendant's use of an
alias, the Defendant then took the stand and explained
why he had used an alias in applying for a drivers license. However, this does not clear the error of the
prior alias evidence. See 29 AM Ji1,r 2d page 390, Evidence 340 citing State v. Beckner, 194 Mo. sp 281, 91
S.W. 892 which provides:
C\V)here the accused has preyiously not submitted evidence of his good character, an error
in admitting evidence on behalf of the prosecution as to the bad character of the actnsed is not
cured hy his submission of
in relmttal
thereof.
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CONCLUSION
When the state proferred the evidence of Defendant's alias the prosecutor represented to the court that
he would tie in Defendant's alias to the same or similar
transaction. r:rhe court allowed the evidence conditionally
on the prosecutors' later showing of materiality. The
prosecution did not ever attempt to tie the alias into the
transaction or offer any other reason for its materiality.
could not possibly have been a material reason to
show why the Defendant had used the name Richard
Feeney in applying for a State Drivers License when
the check in the present case was made out to the real
name of the defendant Harold Reemer and all the persons involved in the case had known the Defendant by
the name of Harold Reemer. Therefore the only possible
use for such evidence was to show questionable character on the part of the accused. This is clearly prejudicial error in the law unless defendant had first offered
of good character. Since defendant had not put his
character in issue, the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
POINT TWO
A VERDICT RENDERED BY A JURY OF SEVEN
PERSONS IN A FELONY CASE IS INVALID.

In the present case one of the jurors became ill during the course of the trial. For some reason no alternate

10
juror was chosen. The Defense counsel stipulated that
the case should be tried with seven jurors and the sick
juror was excused. The verdict rendered was the unanimous verdict of seven jurors.
The Utah Constitution requires that a jury consist
of eight jurors. Art. 1 Sec. 10 provides : "A jury shall
consist of eight jurors." The issue raised is whether the
presence and verdict of one juror may be waived. There
is no question that certain personal constitutional rights
may be waived and that the right to a trial by jury is
one of those rights. See Sec. 77-27-2 Utah Code Ann.
(1953). There is also no question that certain constitutional requirements cannot be waived. For example, parties may not stipulate or agree to submit to the jurisdiction of a court when the constitution does not impower
the court to act. See
v. United States, 219 U.S.
346.
Appellant argues that the constitutional requirement
for eight jurors is that type of requirement that cannot
be waived so as to allow a jury of seven in a felony case.
The implications of the constitutional language that "a
jury shall consist of jurors" is that seven jurors ·wonld
not even be deemed a jury. Sec 78-46-5 Utah Code Ann.
(1953) provides:
A trial jury in capital cases shall consist of
twelve jurors. A trial jury in other criminal
and in civil cases in the District Courts shall con-
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sist of eight jurors; provided, that in civil cases
ad cases of misdemeanors the jury may consist
of any number less than eight upon which the
parties may agree in open court. . . .
Following familiar rules of statutory construction,
the inclusion of allowing stipulation for less than eight
jurors in civil cases and misdemeanor cases would impliedly exclude a jury composed of a lesser number than
eight in felony cases.
Therefore, in light of the Utah Constitutional and
statutory language the Appellant contends that there
can be no less than eight jurors on a felony cases and
to allow a verdict of seven jurors was error.
The case should be reversed and remanded for a
new trial.
Respectfully submitted
Richard J. Leedy
263 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant

